The problem is that legislation to create the guard has yet to pass the Iraqi parliament; Shiite leaders are reluctant to grant authority to the Sunni tribes. Meanwhile, ammunition and other gear promised to the Sunni tribesmen is not getting through, for much the same reason. Mr. Abadi, who is praised by Mr. Abu Risha for his conciliatory steps, has nevertheless failed to bridge the divide. He has also failed to establish the government’s authority over Iranian-backed Shiite militias, which, with no supply problems, are retaking ground from the Islamic State, sometimes with U.S. air support, and then imposing their own sectarian rule.
In his Senate confirmation hearing, Defense Secretary-designate Ashton Carter said red tape had often frustrated prompt delivery of U.S. arms supplies and vowed to tackle the problem once he is on office. That’s welcome, but the trouble in Iraq appears to be more than a bureaucratic blunder. Festering political problems in Baghdad have not been addressed, and President Obama’s commitment of resources and extended timeline for action are simply inadequate. As Mr. Abu Risha told us: “The longer [Islamic State] is in Anbar the more dangerous they will be.”


The hearing on Ashton Carter's nomination to be Secretary of Defense was Wednesday.  We covered it in two snapshots last week:  "Iraq snapshot"  and  "Iraq snapshot."  In the hearing, it was clear that Iraq's crises will not be solved by dropping bombs on the country.

One such exchange:


Ranking Member Jack Reed: One of the issues  -- particular with respect to Iraq --  is that not only  improvement as you suggest in your comments, the longterm defeat, uh, of ISIL rests not just on military operations but on political arrangements.  And what we've witnessed in Iraq particularly was a political arrangement that consciously and deliberately degraded the Sunni population.  At least, that's there perception.  And it gave rise.  So would you acknowledge that part of a strategy has to be constituting an Iraqi government that is perceived by its own people as being a bit fairer and inclusive?
Ashton Carter: Absolutely.  That's what the previous government of Iraq did not do and that was instrumental in their military collapse.

 Ranking Member Jack Reed: And one of the issues that complicates, you've pointed out, in terms of Iran being a strategic issue for the United States in the region is their relative influence in Iraq and throughout the region was enhanced over the last several years by the government in Iraq, by the [Nouri al-] Maliki government.  Is that accurate?

 Ashton Carter:  That is accurate, yes.


And yet still no work on the political.

Still no progress to cite there.