Thursday, July 26, 2012. Chaos and
violence continue, the political crisis and Baghdad's oil stand off with the KRG
continue, the temperature reaches 52 degrees Celsius (125.6 degrees Fahrenheit)
in Iraq, Paul Bremer makes a questionable assertion, again on the joint-hearing
of the House Armed Services and House Veterans Affairs Committeess, and more.
Namo Abdulla (Rudaw) reports on Paul Bremer, the
Bwana of Baghdad, the first US viceroy after the start of the illegal war in
2003. From May 2003 through June 2004, Bremer was the Administrator and among
the most controversial orders he issued was Provisional Authority Order Number 1 which
opens:
Recognizing that the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human
rights abuses and depravations over many years at the hands of the Ba'ath
Party,
Nothing the grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat
posed by the continuation of Ba'ath Party networks and personnel in the
administration of Iraq, and the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Ba'ath
Party officals,
Conerned by the continuing threat to the security of the Coalition
Forces posed by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party,
I hearby promulgate the following
Section 1 is "Disestablishment of the Ba'ath Party." Abdulla reports:
One of which was a decree drafted to outlaw the former Baath
Party. It was called “de-Baathification” in English, but what Iraqis implemented
was closer to the Arabic or Kurdish version of the word, "ijtithath -
rishekeshkrdn" -- to uproot.
About the implementation of this, Bremer showed a little regret. "Of
course," he said, "the de-Baathifcation decree was never intended to exclude
Baathists from being in the government."
"It affected only 1 percent of the Baath Party, the top 1
percent. The mistake I made was turning the implementation of the decree over to
Iraqi politicians, who then expanded the implementation far beyond what was
written in the decree," Bremer said, adding that he should have turned the
decree over to lawyers and judges who would have had a narrower, legal
approach.
Bremer believes that de-Baathification itself was the correct
decision and had been made long before he was appointed as Iraq's
governor.
Now we've tried to be fair to Bremer on this issue. He has taken the blame
on this in the press and that's largely because most of the reporters covering
this were friends with or friendly with Colin Powell who tossed Bremer to the
wolves to protect his own ass -- a little trick Collie's practiced for years.
We'll allow that he did not go off on his own with this. He was acting on the
White House's orders (Bush White House). But to go further and agree with him
that only 1% were effected? Wrong. That's completely wrong to the point that it
is a lie and he's smart enough to know how wrong it is so he is a liar who knows
he's lying. His sudden 'I didn't know this would happen'? The British warned
him against this and have testified in public to that fact. He also knew it was
more than 1% and wanted it to be more than 1% according to John Sawers who is
now the head of MI6 [England's secret service]. Let's revisit that in light of
Bremer's claim today because he sure did come up a lot in testimony in London.
In fact, he may be cited in the testimony of the Iraq Inquiry more than any
American except for George W. Bush. The Iraq Inquiry is a London inquiry by the
UK government which has completed taking testimony but has still not released a
report.
December 15, 2009, the British Ambassador to the
US, Jeremy Greenstock, testified to the Iraq Inquiry that not only did Bremer
ban all the Ba'athists (the dominant political party prior to the US invasion of
Iraq) but he put Ahmed Chalibi in charge of the program which was also seen as a
huge mistake. These actions were not minor. In 2010, the Justice and
Accountability Commission would ban over 500 candidates and do so on the pretext
that they were dangerous Ba'athists.
Chair John Chilcot: On the contrary, I was planning to offer you
the opportunity
to make your final reflections on this very theme, and you have and
thank you,
but are there other comments or observations you would like to
offer before
we close?
General Michael Walker: Only ones that I -- to try and be helpful
really. I think
the poor old Americans have come in for a lot of criticism, and my
personal
belief was that the biggest mistake that was made over Iraq,
notwithstanding
the decision that you may have made your own minds up about, but it
was the
vice-regal nature of [Paul] Bremer's reign, and I think -- I mean,
I don't want to
be personal about this but that particular six months, I think, set
the scene for
Iraq in a way that we were never going to recover from.
The Inquiry repeatedly heard from military and diplomatic witnesses that
Paul
Bremer's decision to disband the Ba'ath Party and being de-Ba'athification
was harmful
and too sweeping. were no longer allowed to work for the government. While
some witnesses may (or may not have) been offering statements that benefitted
from hindsight, certainly those who warned Bremer before the policy was
implemented were able to foresee what eventually happened. John Sawers now heads
England's MI6. In 2003, he was the UK's Special Representative in Baghdad. He
shared his observations to the Iraq Inquiry in testimony given on December 10th:
Committee Member Roderic Lyne: You arrived on 8 May, [head of CPA,
the US' L. Paul] Bremer on the 12th, and within Bremer's first two weeks he had
promulgated two extremely important decisions on de-Ba'athification and on
dissolving the former Iraqi army. Can we look at those two decisions? To what
extent were they Bremer's decisions or -- how had they been pre-cooked in
Washington? I see you have got the Rand Report there, and the Rand Report
suggests there had been a certain interagnecy process in Washington leading to
these decisions, albeit Rand is quite critical of that process. And, very
importantly for us, was the United Kingdom consulted about these crucial
decisions? Was the Prime Minister consulted? Were you consulted? It is pretty
late in the day be then for you to have changed them. Can you take us through
that story.
John Sawers: Can I separate them and deal with de-Ba'athification
first.
Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Yes.
John Sawers: When I arrived in Baghdad on 8 May, one of the
problems that ORHA were facing was that they had been undiscriminating in their
Iraqi partners. They had taken, as their partners, the most senior figures in
the military, in -- not in the military, sorry, in the ministries, in the
police, in institutions like Baghdad University, who happened to be there. And
in several of these instances, Baghdad University was one, the trade ministry
was another, the health ministry, the foreign ministry, the Baghdad police --
the working level were in uproar because they were being obliged to work for the
same Ba'athist masters who had tyrannised them under the Saddam regime, and they
were refusing to cooperate on that basis. So I said, in my first significant
report back to London, which I sent on the Sunday night, the day before Bremer
came back, that there were a number of big issues that needed to be addressed. I
listed five and one of those five was we needed a policy on which Ba'athists
should be allowed to stay in their jobs and which should not. And there was
already a debate going on among Iraqi political leaders about where the line
should be drawn. So I flagged it up on the Sunday evening in my first report,
which arrived on desks on Monday morning, on 11 May. When Bremer arrived late
that evening, he and I had a first discussion, and one of the first things he
said to me was that he needed to give clarity on de-Ba'athification. And he had
some clear ideas on this and he would want to discuss it. So I reported again
early the following monring that this was high on the Bremer's mind and I needed
a steer as to what our policy was. I felt that there was, indeed, an important
need for a policy on de-Ba'athifciation and that, of the various options that
were being considered, some I felt, were more far-reaching than was necessary
but I wasn't an expert on the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and I needed some guidance on
this. I received some guidance the following day, which was helpful, and I used
that as the basis for my discussion with Bremer -- I can't remember if it was
the Wednesday or the Thursday that week but we had a meeting of -- Bremer and
myself and our political teams, where this was discussed, and there was very
strong support among the Iraqi political parties for quite a far-reaching
de-Ba'athification policy. At the meeting itself, I had concerted beforehand
with Ryan Crocker, who was the senior American political adviser, and I said to
him that my guidance was that we should limit the scope of de-Ba'athification to
the top three levels of the Ba'ath Party, which included about 5,000 people, and
that we thought going to the fourth level was a step too far, and it would
involve another 25,000 or so Iraqis, which wasn't necessary. And I thought
Crocker was broadly sympathetic to that approach but at the meeting itself
Bremer set out a strong case for including all four levels, ie the top 30,000
Ba'athists should be removed from their jobs, but there should be a policy in
place for exemptions. I argued the alternative. Actually, unhelpfully, from my
point of view, Ryan Crocker came in in strong support of the Bremer proposal,
and I think he probably smelled the coffee and realised that this was a policy
that had actually already been decided in Washington and there was no point
getting on the wrong side of it. I was not aware of that at that stage and, in
fact, it was only when I subsequently read the very thorough account by the Rand
Corporation of these issues that I realised there had been an extensive exchange
in -- between agencies in Washington.
Despite Sawers' recommendation, Bremer wanted to expand it to four levels.
He knew what he was doing and until Paul Bremer's willing to testify in public
on the record about what happened, all we have is the British witnesses who (a)
were all British officials and (b) seemed plausible in their comments about
Bremer's actions.
Bremer's de-Ba'athifcation is still an issue today although some of that is
not his fault. The Bush White House set as a benchmark in 2007 national
reconciliation and Nouri al-Maliki signed off on it but that never happened. Due
to the increased security problems -- little reported in the US press -- the
decision was made last month to bring back the Ba'athist members of the former
army. Former army? Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2
[misspelled on the original government document as "COALITION PROVISIONAL
SUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2"] disbanded the army. Some Shi'ite politicians have
expressed concern over the decision but it is happening. Xinhua reports, "Hundreds of ex-army officers under
the ousted president Saddam Hussein have gathered Wednesday at a Baghdad
military base to sign up to return to the army, or to be pensioned off. On June
8, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ordered to reinstate the former army officers
during a visit to the northern Iraqi Sunni province of Nineveh."
Turning to the oil issue, Aimee Duffy (The Motley Fool) explains
Nouri's Baghdad-based government's annoyance over ExxonMobil and Chevron's
contracts with the KRG:
Essentially, the Iraqi central government has a problem with the
autonomy of the Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG, when it comes to the oil
business. At the heart of the matter is, naturally, money.
Crude oil exports make up two-thirds of the country's GDP. As domestic demand
increases, the importance of maintaining complete control of its reserves and
production increases as well.
Part of maintaining that control means avoiding production-sharing
contracts with foreign oil companies, which is exactly what Iraq has done. The
central government signs service contracts instead.
But, production-sharing agreements are much more lucrative than the
typical service contracts offered by many foreign governments with national
oil companies. It is the reason, for example, that Exxon won't do business in
Mexico; that country's constitution outlaws PSAs.
Naturally, when Kurdistan offered up production sharing contracts,
the majors jumped at the chance.
One important aspect Duffy leaves out is the March auction Baghdad staged.
It was a bust. We knew that going in. Check the February 22nd snapshot where we noted what was
being offered by Baghdad was "a dingo dog with fleas." That's just one example.
We explained repeatedly that what was being offered -- the fields themselves --
were considered substandard, that the issue raised above (the contracts
themselves -- service contracts) and other issues. They don't appear in Duffy's
analysis but let's go to the day after the May auction ended, from the May 31st snapshot:
Iraq's two day energy auction ended today. Yesterday brought one successful bid.
W.G. Dunlop and Salam Faraj (AFP)
explain, "Iraq on Thursday closed a landmark auction of
energy exploration blocks with just three contracts awarded out of a potential
12, dampening hopes the sale would cement its role as a key global supplier."
The offerings weren't seen as desirable and the deals offered even less so. But
big business began sending signals this auction would not go well over two
months ago. (And we've noted that at least three times in previous months.)
That's due to the instability in Iraq caused by Nouri -- and it is seen as
caused by Nouri in the oil sector because he is the prime minister, he did pick
a fight with Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, he did order Vice President
Tareq al-Hashemi arrested. All the instability in recent months have not helped.
His attacks on ExxonMobil and their deal with the KRG has not helped. Nouri
al-Maliki is bad for business. If Iraq had the arrangement they did under Saddam
Hussein, Nouri could get away with that. But he's going to have to grasp real
soon that state oil isn't what it was under Hussein. The economic model (imposed
by the US) is mixed. And if Iraqis hadn't fought back, it would be strictly
privatized. Nouri's not yet learned that his actions impact Iraq's business.
(And, in fairness to Nouri, this is a new thing for Iraq. Saddam Hussein could
do anything and it wasn't an issue unless the super powers decided it was. But,
again, it's a mixed model now. Nouri might need to bring in some economic
advisors from out of the country.) W.G. Dunlop and Salam Faraj (AFP)
report Iraq's response to the poor showing at the auction
is to declare that they will hold another one.
Those issues do matter to businesses. The reason the KRG has a better
business sector post-March-2003 invasion of Iraq is because it is seen as more
stable and more calm and businesses feel safer -- both physically and in terms
of stability -- doing business in the KRG. [If you dbout that, not only have you
missed years and years of press on the KRG but you've also missed Priyanka Pradhan's article today for Kipp Report --
"Iraqi Kurdistan seems far removed from those stereotypical war torn, strife
ridden images conjured up in the minds of people who've last heard of Iraq as
one of the world's most dangerous places to visit." -- or yesterday's piece by Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange
Program I for the Richmond Times Dispatch.] Also very importnat,
Nouri's crazy does not play well for the business community and his inability to
move Iraq forward after 6 years in the post does not go unnoticed by the
international business community. Patrick Osgood (Arabian Oil and Gas)
offers this view on the issue:
The confirmed entry of Chevron has also dealt Iraqi Prime Minister
Nour Al-Maliki a blow in his campaign against Exxon’s Kurdish contracts, and
further highlights the attractiveness of the terms on offer from the KRG
relative to those from the central government after the Oil Ministry's fourth
fidding round fiasco in late May.
Chevron had a long-standing relationship with the Iraqi government,
having started a technical assistance program in Iraq in 2003. The company had
pre-qualified to bid in the fourth round auction, but declined to
bid.
It is, however, easy to overplay the significance of the Chevron
move.
Unlike Exxon, Chevron has no prior interests in south Iraq, save
for a commitment to take liftings of Iraqi crude, which the Oil Ministry did not
mention. The blocks are not in disputed territory, unlike three of the six
blocks awarded to Exxon, which have tied Rex Tillerson’s company to Kurdish
territorial maximalism as well as the dispute over oil
policy.
Trend News Agency notes, "The Kurdistan
administration in nothern Iraq has oil reserves of 45 billion barrels." Sunday,
Nasiriyah reported the National Alliance MP Abdul
Salam al-Mliki was telling the press that the National Alliance would file a
lawsuit against the KRG becuase of exports to Turkey as well as contracts with
ExxonMobil and Chevron. An on the record threat of a lawsuit. That's among the
many things that makes AKnews assertion, "An Iraqi legal expert
said he is counting on the results of the efforts of the parliamentary committee
responsible for monitoring the oil disputes between Baghdad and Erbil after
visiting and meeting with officials in the Ministry of Natural Resources in the
Kurdistan Region, adding that the crisis will be resolved during the next two
days," so questionable.
Questionable is also reporting or 'reporting.' Rod Nordland (New York Times) writes
today, "Al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq clashed with the country's security forces
on Thursday, the second attack this week in what Al Qaeda in Iraq's leader has
depicted as a new offensive aimed at recapturing lost ground." Considering the
paper's 'reporting' on Iraq since 2001 (days after 9-11 they ran a front page
story falsely connecting Iraq to 9-11 and, no, Judith Miller wasn't the writer),
you'd think the paper would try sticking to what they know when detailing
'facts.' The group is the Islamic State of Iraq. Their leader is Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi. Nordland and his paper may believe (today) that al-Baghdadi is the
leader of al Qaeda in Iraq but they do not know that and they can't prove it.
His group is affiliated with al Qaeda in Iraq. Again, with all they've gotten
wrong in the not-so-distant past on Iraq, you'd think they'd tread very
carefully when offering 'facts' on Iraq. Prashant Rao (AFP) notes of the Islamic
State of Iraq, "Last weekend, the group said it would look to retake territory,
and appealed for Sunni tribes to provide support and send fighters, in an
Internet audio message purportedly left by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi." The
Islamic State of Iraq issued a public statement on Sunday which included a
threat of attacks on US soil.
Brian Bennett (Los Angeles Times) reports
that the House Homeland Security Commission held a hearing to assess
the threat. Janet Napolitano, the Secretary on
Homeland Security, appeared before the Committee.
Secretary Janet Napolitano:
While the United States has made significant progress, threats from terrorists
-- including, but not limited to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliated groups --
persist and continually evolve, and the demands on DHS continue to grow. Today's
threats are not limited to any one individual group or ideology and are not
defined or contained by international borders. Terrorists tactics can be as
simple as a homemade bomb and as sophisticated as a biological threat or
coordinated cyber attack.
I wasn't at the hearing, that's from
her opening statement. You can read it [PDF format warning] here. Matthew Olsen of the National
Counterterrorism Center also testified. You can read his opening statement here.
Matthew Olsen: [. . .] we
remain at war with al-Qa'ida, and we face an evolving threat from its affiliates
and adherents. America's campaign against terrorism did not end with the mission
at Bin Ladin's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Indeed, the threats we face
have become more diverse. As al-Qa'ida's core leadership struggles to remain
relevant, the group has turned to its affiliates and adherents to carry out
attacks and to advance its ideology. These groups are from an array of
countries, including Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq and Iran. To varying degrees,
these groups coordinate their activities and follow the direction of al-Qa'ida
leaders in Pakistan. Many of the extremist groups themselves are
multidimensional, blurring the lines between terrorist group, insurgency and
criminal gang.
If there is a threat, it's important that the press identify it correctly.
It's also important that the press report it. As a whole the American press is
failing at both objectives.
Violence continues in Iraq. Xinhua notes this late Wednesday violence, "As many as
seven al-Qaida fighters and five security members were killed in clashes at a
former al-Qaida stronghold in Iraq's eastern province of Diyala, a provincial
police told Xinhua on Thursday." AP notes that 11 police officers were
killed late last night and early this morning and "Diyala provincial spokesman
Salih Ebressim Khalil said militants targeted the Iraqi army helicopter, killing
one soldier, wounding another and forcing it to make an emergency landing." Al Rafidayn reports that a Tikrit car
bombing has left 5 people dead and ten injured.
Like violence, the political crisis continues. The Economist offers their take on the political
crisis today:
But Mr Maliki, who has been in charge since 2006, is opposed not
just by Sunni jihadists. Many moderate Iraqis, both Shias and Sunnis, fear he is
heading down a path to dictatorship. The political atmosphere is toxic. No
meaningful legislation, apart from an annual budget, has been passed for several
years. One of the country’s two vice-presidents, Tareq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, is
being tried in absentia for alleged links to terrorism. Iraq’s Kurds
are increasingly divorced from the rest of the country: their regional
government has now signed 48 oil contracts without the consent of the national
government in Baghdad, which is infuriated. Meanwhile people in the capital and
other towns, suffering sweltering temperatures during the fasting month of
Ramadan, are frequently bereft of electricity. There have been angry mass
protests in Basra, the main town of the south, against dire public
services.
However, Mr Maliki is still managing to shore up support, mainly
among his fellow Shias, who make up a good 60% of the population. One of the
Kurds’ two main leaders, Jalal Talabani, the country’s president, who wants to
sustain the status quo by keeping Mr Maliki in place, has ensured that
parliament does not have a chance to vote on a no-confidence
motion.
Tuesday evening, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met with Deputy Prime
Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq. al-Mutlaq belongs to Iraqiya which came in first in
the March 2010 elections while Nouri belongs to State of Law which came in
second. Dar Addustour reports that the two
discussed the stalemate, upcoming provincial elections and the election
commission. Alsumaria notes that Ayad Allawi (head of
Iraqiya) has stated today that the need to question Nouri before Parliament
continues and needs to be speeded up. Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law came in
second to Iraqiya which should have ended any hopes Nouri had for a second term
as prime minister. But the White House backed Nouri -- and spat on the Iraqi
voters and the Iraqi Constitution -- allowing Nouri to create Political
Stalemate I which lasted for 8 months. It was ended when the all parties --
including Nouri -- agreed to the US-brokered Erbil Agreement. It gave the Kurds
this, Iraqiya that, etc. Nouri? It gave him a second term as prime minister. He
used the Erbil Agreement to get that, pretended he was going to honor the
contract but, as soon as he was named prime minister, he tossed it aside. Since
the summer of 2011, the Kurds, Iraqiya and Moqtada al-Sadr have been publicly
calling for a return to the Erbil Agreement. This is Political Stalemate II.
Currently, there is a move -- and it's Constitutional -- to call Nouri before
the Parliament and question him. After questioning, a vote could be taken to
determine whether or not the answers he provided restored confidence in him or
meant that the MPs registered a no-confidence vote.
Alsumaria notes that Ayad Allawi stated he was reviewing the strategy for
the next move. All Iraq News adds that he restated, in
the press statement, his opinion that the Reform Commission was a waste of time.
Back on December 21st, Speaker of Parliament Osama al-Nujaifi (a member of
Iraqiya) and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani (a Kurd) began calling for a
national conference to address the ongoing stalemate and/or crisis. Nouri threw
every road block he could think of to delay and stop that from happening. In
June, suddenly he wanted a Reform Commission to 'solve' the problem. The Reform
Commission is a joke. It's always been a joke. It's Nouri's pets declaring what
they want for him and it has no teeth so even if the other political players had
full participation, nothing would come from it. Allawi notes that the Erbil
Agreement needs to be reinstated and that a series of 'reforms' prepared by
(Nouri's) National Alliance isn't going to change that. He notes the demands
remain the same as they've been all along.
In a sign of what a tool the National Alliance is becoming for Nouri
(largely Ammar al-Hakim and Ibrahim al-Jafaari's segment of the National
Alliance) on Saturday, Nasiriyah reported that the National
Alliance was vowing to refuse to allow the bill to pass that would limit a prime
minister to two terms (it would also put a two-term limit on the presidency and
on the Speaker of Parliament but the National Alliance is only concerned with
Nouri).
The Khaleej Times' editorial board
notes, "While politicians squabble
for control in the Iraqi parliament, the roads and streets of the country are
stained with blood of innocent people. If the country’s politicians don’t
realise the gravity of the situation and reach a compromise, there’s a
possibility that Iraq might become ungovernable again."
Today the Parliament was supposed to pass an Election Law which would allow
for provincial elections in March of next year. Nasiriyah reports that the vote has been postponed.
Also today, Alsumaria notes, the temperature was expected to
reach 49 degrees Celsius. That's 120 degrees Farehnheit (actually 120.2
degrees). Al Rafidayn notes that today's been
declared a holiday as a result of the heat. AFP notes that it actually reached 52
degrees Celsius (125.6 degrees Farehnheit) and they report:
Hunched over, Yaqub mutters softly, "It's Ramadan, and I am fasting," as
if to justify his actions, before he steps underneath an outdoor shower in
central Baghdad to cool off in the boiling heat.
"It's hard," the delivery man admits, referring to the temperatures
across Iraq which have topped 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) in
recent days, spurring authorities to declare Thursday a holiday for all
government workers.
"This feels good," Yaqub, 53, says after a refreshing splash of
water.
Yesterday's snapshot covered the joint-hearing of
the US House Armed Services Committee and House Veterans Affairs Committee. I
stated, "Sequestration was discussed. This is an automatic measure that will
kick in if the buget is not balanced. Established in the hearing is the Veterans
Affairs will not be effected but the Defense Dept will be." A community member
noted Michael Levine's Honolulu Civil Beat who
quotes VA Secretary Eric Shinseki stating VA "is exempt from sequestration --
except for administrative costs." Which is it? Levine's correct in his quote.
But that's not what we've been covering or that veterans have been worried
about. Their concern and what we've been covering is health care, etc. That will
not be effected. Sequestration will not touch that. Administrative efforts?
Though hard for many to believe, the VA could get slower. But if sequestration
kicks in (automatic budget cuts), VA will not be effected in terms of what it
supplies veterans. Senators Patty Murray and Richard Burr and House Reps Jeff
Miller and Bob Filner -- among others -- worked very hard on addressing this:
Veterans will not be effected. The White House is very clear on how bad that
would look for them if veterans benefits were cut. Barack Obama already has
enough problems with veterans issues as Reuters
pointes out:
His 2013 budget request for the VA
is more than $40 billion, or 41 percent, bigger than the one he inherited when
he took office, helping to cover construction of hospitals and clinics, staff
increases, and expanded disability benefits. That has come despite the warning
from some in the outgoing George W. Bush administration that the VA apparatus
"is broken, just play defense," according to a member of Obama's transition
team.
Yet, based on interviews with veterans,
their advocates, and VA and other administration officials, as well as a review
of available data, life for many veterans has grown more challenging under
Obama's watch.
Veterans returning home today join lines
for disability payments much longer than those Obama called intolerable in 2008.
Their chances of finding jobs in a bleak economy are worse than those of most
other Americans. Veterans' complaints of employment discrimination by the
federal government have actually risen.
Veterans remain more likely to be homeless
than the general population. The VA estimates more than 67,000 sleep in shelters
and on the streets or are otherwise considered homeless, a figure that is only
slightly better than in 2009.
In the hearing yesterday, Shinseki and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
were the two witnesses offering testimony. Ranking Member Bob Filner spoke of
how he felt there should be an exit boot camp to address various issues that can
come up in civilian life. Last night, Ava's covered that in "The joint Armed Service and House Veterans hearing
(Ava)." On the continued lack of interface between VA and DoD, Steve Vogel (Washington Post) notes this
morning, "The Washington Post reported in November that despite
the recommendations of the Dole-Shalala commission in 2007 to create a single
point of contact to cut red tape for the most severely wounded service members,
DoD and VA had instead created at least a dozen programs to coordinate the
care." Esther Carey (Federal News Radio)
reports today, "The two departments signed a roadmap agreement that will let
them develop a future integrated system under a common technology framework.
Shinseki said a key difference between the current effort and other failures
over the past 10 years was that the way ahead envisions an open-architecture
system rather than one that hinges on closed, proprietary systems." Shinseki
said a lot. A lot of hot air, a lot of justifications, a lot of nonsense. We'll
note two members who called this happy talk out.
US House Rep Ann Marie Buerkle: My question has to do with -- and
you've heard some references to it -- the Dole - Shalala Commission and the fact
that now, five years later, after they issued this urgent call to streamline, to
make sure that we have a single point of reference for the care and service and
benefits of our military we have to very distinct entities. We've had multiple
hearings trying to get assurance from DoD and the VA as to how you're going to
get this together so we can make sure that our veterans get the services without
being overwhelmed by an extremely complex system. So I would ask you both today,
please, how specifically -- what are the goals, what is the plan, to get these
two entitites under one roof so that you're complying with the Dole - Shalala
Commission and their recommendations for our veterans. I thank you
both.
Secretary Eric Shinseki: The program, the Federal Recovery
Coordination Program, in existence since 2007, and I think as Secretary Panetta
indicated earlier, two good Departments launched and essentially developed good
programs that don't quite harmonize. We have a task force with the specific
direction to study and bring harmony to these programs, where are we being --
duplicating one another? Where are we not doing things that we should be doing?
So it's going to get a good look here. And I'd say in the next couple of months.
And I'd be happy -- and I think
Secretary Panetta would be as well -- to make
our people available to provide the results of that.
Secretary Leon Panetta: You know, we -- Look, we -- I think --
Secretary Shinseki and I share the same frustration. I mean, I -- We've been
working on this and frankly we've been pushing on this to say why can't we get
faster results? Why can't we get this done on a faster track? And, you know,
bottom line is: Frankly, we're just going to have to kick ass and try to make it
happen and that's what we're going to do.
US House Rep Ann Marie Buerkle: I would suggest in your opening
statement, Mr. Panetta, you mentioned commitment and we look to the military,
their commitment, as an example to our country. We should be that committed to
them to make sure that we get this job done. I thank you both very
much.
Though he spoke several people before Buerkle, US House Rep Bill
Johnson's comments really fit with her remarks .
US House Rep Bill Johnson: I understand that you can't account for
the last 10 years, Mr. Secretary [Shinseki] and I understand that you've got two
bureaucracies that don't necessarily like to be told what to do and get along
all the time. But I'll submit to you that another five years is-is unacceptable.
It's unacceptable to me and, gentlemen, it ought to be unacceptable to you. This
is not a matter of can-do or should-do. This is a matter of want-to and will-do.
This is 2012. And one of the underlying issues, Mr. Secretary, quite honestly is
the VA's lack of an overall technology architecture. You and I have talked about
this before and it still doesn't exist today as far as I know. I've pointed that
out. My Committee has pointed that out. Organizations outside that have looked
at the VA's IT Dept have pointed that out. You know, I'm just not convinced that
five years from now -- given that I don't know where you two will be -- but my
fear is that we're going to be sitting right here talking about this same issue
again because we're not going about it with the discipline that's needed. I come
from an information techonology career of over 30 years. I worked at US Special
Operations Command as the Director of the CIO staff. I know what it takes to get
this stuff done and five years, gentlemen, is totallly unacceptable. And I don't
really have a question for you I just want you to fix this for crying out loud.
Those are some pretty important statements even before you factor in that they came from someone with an Information and Technology (IT) background. We'll close out on Wednesday's hearing by including this section where US House Rep Niki Tsongas is
noting the documentary The Invisible War:
US House Rep Niki Tsongas: As you [Shinseki] say, "That which
starts during military service ends up in the VA." And that movie so painfully
highlights the multiple bureaucratic hurdles survivors of such assualts -- which
are all too frequent across all the services -- must endure to prove that their
physical or their psychiatric symptoms are connected to an incident of Military
Sexual Trauma. And shows that too often, victims are unsuccessful in pursuing
their claims for assistance. To address one aspect of this problem, the Fiscal
Year 2012 Defense Authorization Act included language that required the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to
develop a comprehensive policy for the Dept of Defense on the retention of
access to evidence and records relating to sexual assault involving members of
the Armed Services. This policy is to be in place by October 1, 2012. Can you
both comment on the status of this policy? I'd also welcome any further thoughts
you may have on how these claims can be processed faster and more accurately.
Secretary Leon Panetta: It's a -- It's a very important issue for
me. I'm not going to wait for the legislation to put that policy in place
because I think it ought to take place in providing that kind of guidance and
assistance to those that have been the victims of sexual assault so that they
get the kind of support that they need in order to get not only the care they
need but, if they want to continue their career, to get the support system that
would allow them to continue their career. And I think it's fair to say that
Secretary Shinseki and I are going to work together on to make sure that we can
-- we can deal with this on both sides -- not only on the Defense side, but on
the Veterans side for those that ultimately move in that direction.
US House Rep Niki Tsongas: Thank you both. I look forward to seeing
that policy in effect.
