Special Envoy for the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey And
Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Nathan A. Sales
Press Briefing Room
August 1, 2019
Thank you all for coming today.
Today we’re very happy to have with us the Secretary of State’s Special
Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Ambassador Jim Jeffrey,
as well as the Secretary’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador
The two of them have some opening remarks, and then we’ll be happy to
take some questions, and they’ll be providing an update on the
coalition’s efforts to defeat ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and across the globe.
Hello, everybody. Thanks for
coming. Let me start with the situation of what we call the core in
Iraq and Syria. The 80-member Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS achieved a
significant victory by destroying the last remnants of the ISIS
physical caliphate along the Euphrates in Syria in March. This removed
one important element of ISIS’s threat to the international community,
but not the only one. It is still a threat in this core area of Iraq
and Syria, and I’ll get into that. And as Nathan will talk about, it is
still a threat globally.
The formation of this coalition, with the support of much of the
international community, is itself a major diplomatic and
counterterrorism success. We are encouraged by members’ commitments to
stay active even after the defeat of the physical caliphate. We also
welcome since January 2017 12 new members from Africa and Asia to the
The coalition, aside from the military effort, takes on ISIS in four
separate civilian ways: through counter-financing, through
counter-messaging and public affairs, through foreign terrorist fighter
activities, and finally through stabilization of areas that have been
liberated from ISIS. All are critical.
Let me talk about Iraq and Syria. In Syria, after the defeat of the
caliphate, we are working with the Syrian Democratic Forces, our local
partner, to go after cells that have been left behind. That activity is
going on well. We are seeing a diminuation
of the remaining limited ISIS capabilities in the northeast of the
country. But that’s only where we are. ISIS elements are still very
active to the south of the Euphrates, where the regime, the Assad
regime, does not have control, and in Idlib, which is a major terrorist
concern not just for ISIS.
As you know, the President announced a deliberate and coordinated
drawdown of our remaining American forces in the northeast back in
December. He then added that he would be planning to keep a small
residual contingent of American forces indefinitely there. What we’re
looking is to get coalition partners to make more of a contribution of
on-the-ground forces to continue the training, equipping, and
accompanying of local forces. We haven’t finished our discussions with
these countries yet, but we’re pretty optimistic that we will get
considerably more than we’ve had in the past.
Let me turn to Iraq. Of course, after the defeat of ISIS in Mosul,
Iraq did not have an ISIS terrain-holding threat. But what we have seen
is a persistent, resilient, rural terrorist level of violence generated
by these underground cells of ISIS, particularly in the area south of –
as you’re looking at the map – Mosul and the Kurdish areas down to –
down to Baghdad. We’re working closely with the Iraqi military on this
effort. We have some scores of coalition countries with us in that
fight. We have some 5,000 U.S. forces there, thousands more of
coalition forces. We’ve trained over 200,000 Iraqi army, police, and
Peshmerga forces in this fight, and we’ll continue it.
A couple of very specific civilian-side issues related to this core
battle: First of all, the liberation of the last areas in Syria has
produced both a large collection of foreign – of terrorist fighters –
some 10,000 of them are under lock and key in northeast Syria, held by
the SDF with some support from us. Most of them, about 8,000, are Iraqi
or Syrian nationals, and we have efforts in place – they’re going
slowly – to move – but they’re going – to move the Iraqis back to Iraq,
and the Syrians to be placed on trial.
A bigger problem from the standpoint of logistics and humanitarian
effort is the al-Hawl displaced persons camp. Basically, there’s some
70,000 people there, down a bit from last month. These are mainly
people – family members of ISIS fighters. There’s about, oh, 60,000
Iraqis and Syrians among those numbers, but again, there’s about 10,000
third-country foreigners associated with the 2,000 non-Iraqi, non-Syrian
foreign terrorist fighters that are being held in the various detention
facilities. There are a variety of humanitarian issues that we’re
working our way through in al-Hawl, but there’s also a problem of
radicalization. In the long run, what we’re trying to do is to get
people out and back into their communities.
Finally, stabilization. We have a major stabilization effort
underway in Iraq with the coalition in support of UNDP’s FFS, which is a
fund for stabilization. We have helped return 4.3 million people to
their homes after the fighting was over and it brought electricity,
water, and immediate medical services to about 1.5 million Iraqis. In
Syria, the President has decided that we will stop our stabilization
funding. We’re continuing our humanitarian funding, which is about $10
billion for Syria alone since that war broke out in 2011. But we’ll
turn to our partners to do the stabilization funding. We received $325
million last year. We’re hoping for a similar amount this year as part
of the spirit of burden-sharing, which is also why we’re turning to them
for forces to be with us in northeast Syria.
I’ll stop at this point and turn it over to Nathan. Thank you.
Thanks, Jim, and thanks,
everybody, for being here today. So in addition to the work that
Ambassador Jeffrey has highlighted in Iraq and Syria, we also need to
keep ISIS from continuing the fight from its international networks.
The so-called ISIS caliphate has been destroyed, but the ISIS brand
lives on around the world.
Today I’ll summarize the ISIS-related threats we face across the
globe as well as the steps that we are taking with our coalition
partners to counter those threats. So here are a few examples of the
threats we’re seeing. In Africa, ISIS-linked groups are on the rise.
ISIS branches and networks now span the African continent from east to
west and north to south. They’ve increased the lethality of their
attacks, they’ve expanded into new areas, and they’ve repeatedly
targeted U.S. interests.
In Nigeria, for example, ISIS West Africa has begun to impose Sharia
law in the areas it controls, and it’s killed hundreds of Nigerian
forces in the past year.
In Niger, ISIS affiliates were responsible for the deaths of four
American soldiers in an ambush in October of 2017. This past May, ISIS
claimed to have killed 40 Nigerien soldiers at Tongo Tongo. In places
like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, local armed
groups are publicly aligning themselves with ISIS.
And in Egypt, ISIS Sinai conducts regular attacks against Egyptian
security forces in the Sinai while also targeting tourist sites and
churches in mainland Egypt. I’ll be traveling to Cairo next week to
discuss a range of counterterrorism issues including this threat.
In South Asia, ISIS networks and ISIS-inspired terrorists are
increasingly active. We saw this on Easter Sunday in Sri Lanka. The
Easter attacks were a grim reminder that ISIS-inspired terrorists are
able to carry out complex and deadly attacks. That’s why the State
Department is working to revitalize our CT partnership with Sri Lanka,
particularly building capacity in the areas of law enforcement and
Meanwhile in Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan has become one of the
deadliest ISIS affiliates in the world. In the past year, they’ve
carried out dozens of attacks, killing close to 800 people and injuring
over 1,400 more.
Let me now explain our vision for the role that the 80-member Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS can play going forward. In this next stage of
the campaign, my team is focusing on countering ISIS around the world as
Ambassador Jeffrey and his team work to consolidate ISIS’s territorial
defeats in the core. To accomplish this, we’ll need to supplement our
military efforts with civilian sector counterterrorism tools. And once
again, we’ll be looking for our coalition partners to join us in this
fight. The United States can’t do this alone.
At the coalition political directors meeting in Paris in June, we
discussed our collective responsibility to thwart ISIS’s global
ambitions. We’re now working closely with our partners to identify
focus regions for the coalition, and we expect to have more clarity soon
on where we intend to be active. As an important next step, we’re
planning a coalition meeting in the fall focused on West Africa and the
In this new phase of the fight, we’ll focus on four key areas which
Ambassador Jeffrey has previewed: law enforcement, border security, the
terrorist financing, and counter-messaging. Let me say a few words
about each of them.
First, across the coalition, we need to prosecute ISIS leaders,
fighters, financiers, and facilitators for the crimes they’ve
committed. That includes building the law enforcement capacity of
partner states that have the will to act but might lack the resources or
expertise to do so. It also means repatriating and prosecuting foreign
terrorist fighters. I’ll come back to that in a minute.
Second, coalition members need to harden our borders against ISIS
travel and help other countries do the same. We estimate that since
2015 some 1,200 ISIS fighters have traveled back home to Europe, while
hundreds more have returned to Southeast Asia. Other terrorists,
inspired by ISIS and other terrorist groups, likewise are looking to
cross international borders.
To combat this threat, we need to help frontline states fully
implement UN Security Council Resolution 2396, a historic resolution
that requires the use of screening tools like watch lists, airline
reservation data, and biometrics. Here in the United States, we’ve been
using these sorts of tools for years, and in some cases decades, and
we’re glad that the rest of the world is catching up.
Third, we need to cut off the flow of money to ISIS networks around
the world. One of our most effective weapons against terrorism is
sanctions and designations. Last year, the State Department announced
19 related ISIS – 19 ISIS-related designations and the Treasury
Department completed another 14. We’ll be looking to add to those
In addition, last year the UN listed 11 ISIS-linked individuals at
the so-called 1267 Committee. That’s a good start, but these UN
designations need to be implemented in individual countries, and that
means we need more partners to adopt effective domestic designations
regimes that allow them to sanction known terrorists.
Fourth and finally, we need to deny ISIS the ability to radicalize
the next generation of fighters. While the caliphate has been
destroyed, ISIS’s ability to inspire attacks persists because its
ideology persists. We need to collectively refute the hateful,
intolerant, and supremacist messaging that helped give rise to ISIS in
the first place.
Let me end with a final word on prosecutions. There’s currently
about 2,000 ISIS foreign fighters in SDF custody in Syria, and that’s in
addition to the Syrian and Iraqi citizens captured by the SDF. Let me
be clear: These fighters are dangerous, battle-hardened terrorists.
They left comfortable lives to go to the desert to fight for an idea,
and they’re still committed to that idea. We all have an obligation to
keep them from ever returning to the battlefield.
The most effective way to do that is for countries of origin to take
back their citizens and prosecute them for crimes they’ve committed.
That’s what the United States has done for our citizen fighters and
that’s what we expect other countries to do as well. This is a priority
for the President and it’s a priority for the Secretary.
To sum up, the ISIS threat is evolving and our fight is entering a
new phase. It’s imperative that the coalition approach the effort to
defeat ISIS globally with the same level of urgency and commitment that
brought us victory in Syria and Iraq. We owe it to the past victims of
ISIS to make sure that there are no future victims of ISIS.
Thanks, and Jim and I would be happy to take some questions.
Great. Thanks. We’ll start with Reuters, Lesley.
Thank you very much. I was wondering if,
given this is linked, whether you can confirm that Usama bin Ladin’s
son has been killed, Hamza bin Ladin, and was it done in Syria?
I was wondering whether that would be the first question or the second question.
Yes, we’re aware of the reports. We don’t comment on intelligence matters.
Can you – can I ask just one quick – are you aware of him ever operating in the areas that we’re discussing today?
As I mentioned, we’re not going to comment publicly on intelligence reports.
Let’s go to Said, please.
Thank you. Ambassador Jeffrey, I have a
quick question for you on Idlib. You acknowledge that there is a large
presence of terrorists in Idlib, and not only ISIS but also other groups
such as al-Nusrah and so on. How do you see the Idlib situation being
resolved? Because on the one hand, you don’t want forces, the regime or
the Russians, to attack Idlib, but on the other, you want to end that
situation. Thank you.
First of all, it’s the very
definition of a complex situation, as you just laid out. Our primary
issue right now is to halt the violence against civilians in Idlib. As
President Trump said in Osaka, even if there are terrorists there,
that’s no excuse to bomb 3 million people who are already internally
displaced. Today, with a lot of support from the United States, the
secretary-general just announced a board of inquiry to investigate what
has happened in Idlib, particularly the attacks on civilians since the
Turkish-Russian Sochi agreement to set up a ceasefire, which has been
violated mainly by the regime since that time in September of 2018.
So that’s where our priority is, to put pressure on the regime and on
the Russians to stop those bombing attacks. We have put pressure on
them not to use chemical weapons successfully, not to undertake a major
offensive – they haven’t – and not to do anything that would generate
huge refugee flows, destabilizing Turkey and Europe. That we’ve been
successful in. We’re still working on this important issue of the
bombing of civilians.
National Public Radio, Jill.
Thanks. I’d just follow up on that. Can
you just characterize your dealings with the Russians on this? Because
it seems that the U.S. and Russia are, again, completely at odds over
what’s even happening in Idlib.
The Russians do deny many
things that we believe are facts – we’re sure that are facts. At every
level, including President Trump in Osaka with President Putin; with
President Putin when I accompanied Mike Pompeo to Sochi in May; and at
every other level, including basically several conversations a week at
mine and other levels, we raise this at the very top with the Russians.
But just – but when you were in Sochi, I
mean, the Secretary seemed to suggest that there was some sort of real
deal with the Russians. What happened with that?
Well, there’s a real deal to
try to get the ceasefire restored. The Russians have now, we believe –
we’re just getting the tickers in now – have announced at what we used
to call Astana – now I think it’s Nur-Sultan – in Kazakhstan that in a
meeting with the Turks and Iranians that they have effected yet another
ceasefire. The problem is we’ve helped broker a handful of ceasefires
there. They keep on falling apart, and the bombings continue.
Let’s go to Laurie.
The Kurds, I want to begin, really do
appreciate this administration’s vigorous work to defeat the territorial
ISIS, so thank you both. Ambassador Jeffrey, can we understand from
your comments that you’re still committed to working with and protecting
your Kurdish partners in Syria?
We are committed to defeating
ISIS in northeast Syria. The SDF, which is a mixed Kurdish-Arabic
military force, is our partner there. We are committed to those who
have fought with us not being attacked and not being harmed by anyone.
The President made that clear publicly. That includes our concerns
about the Turks.
Equally, we’re very concerned about the threat of the PKK and
offshoots of the PKK against Turkey, which lost a diplomatic official in
Erbil just last week. So we’re trying to balance both of these very
important concerns with one very important NATO ally and one important
partner in the fight against ISIS.
MR PALLADINO: Wall Street Journal
Thanks. To follow on Laurie’s question,
what is the status of any talks with the Turks about protecting the
Kurds and the possibility of an invasion?
And then separately, what is the status of talks with European countries, particularly on repatriation of foreign fighters?
There are no talks with the
Turks on protecting the Kurds – which make up a very significant percent
of the Turkish population, for example – or stopping an invasion,
because we don’t see an invasion. We are talking with the Turks, and
we’re doing it right now, on the possibility of a safe zone that would
have U.S. and Turkish forces, again, dealing with Turkish security
concerns along a band in northeast Syria right up to the Turkish
border. We don’t have an agreement yet, but exchanges are continuing.
And on foreign terrorist fighter
repatriation and prosecution, we’ve seen some successes and we’d like to
see more. Countries like Kazakhstan and Kosovo have been able to
repatriate dozens – and in some cases hundreds – of fighters and their
family members, prosecuting people for crimes and, as far as families
and children are concerned, placing them in rehabilitation and
reintegration programs and de-radicalization programs.
Italy recently announced that it was repatriating one fighter, and
that person will be investigated for prosecution. We’d like to see more
Western European countries follow suit. I think the President has been
very clear about this and the Secretary has as well. Every country has
an obligation to solve the problem of their citizens who’ve gone off to
fight for ISIS. No one should expect the United States to solve this
problem for them or the SDF or anyone else. This is a problem that
fundamentally is owned by the countries where their citizens were
radicalized back at home.
MR PALLADINO: New York Times
Hi. Lara Jakes with the Times
To follow up on that, ambassador, how is the United States ensuring
that the forces who are detaining some of these ISIS fighters and their
families are still respecting their human rights and are not subject to
any kind of abuse?
I have a follow-up question for you in a second, but just a tactical
question, Ambassador Jeffrey. Can you assess how many ISIS fighters
remain in Syria and Iraq at this time?
And then pivoting back to you for one second, can you also assess to
what extent that ISIS-Khorasan is a threat outside of the borders of
Let me answer part one and part three.
Of this five-part question.
We didn’t get up to a five-part question. (Laughter.)
Maybe we can diagram this out. Yeah.
So we assess that the SDF has been very committed to ensuring that
these very dangerous terror suspects are, first of all, treated
securely, and second of all, treated humanely. Now, the situation could
be better. These prisons in which they are being held are, in many
cases, ad hoc improvisations that were not designed as maximum security
facilities. That is part of the reason why we think that there is a
sense of urgency for countries to take their citizens back and prosecute
them so that they can be placed into more permanent facilities if
As for ISIS-Khorasan, yeah, it’s a major problem in the region. And
what we have to do is make sure that ISIS-Khorasan, which has committed a
number of attacks in the region, is not able to engage in external
Is ISIS-Khorasan —
And this is part four?
Yes, it is.
And I have a follow-up to your part one. Is ISIS-Khorasan a threat to the United States?
Any ISIS affiliate around the
world has the – that has the capability and intent to conduct external
operations is a threat to the United States and our partners and our
Okay, thank you. And then you described
what was happening. You had some
confidence with the SDF. How about
with Iraqi Security Forces?
Ambassador, do you want to take that one?
I would have preferred to
reinforce your point that the SDF – because I’ve been on the ground with
people who have been in these camps and working with them. We are very
confident about them. As you know because we both went out there
earlier, the Iraqi Security Forces and government have had problems in
the past with holding prisoners. We don’t see the same level of problem
now. It is an issue that I and others raise with the top level of the
Iraqi government all of the time, however.
In terms of the ISIS numbers, between Iraq and Syria – and this is
only a guesstimate – it would be, say, 15,000 with a standard deviation
of significant thousands in either direction.
And mostly in Syria or mostly in Iraq?
It’s split between the two.
But remember, they see this as one front, and these people, we know,
travel back and forth south of the Euphrates. They don’t go through the
northeast because we have good security there, but they do go south of
Let’s go Fox, Rich.
Ambassador Sales, as you talk about ISIS,
what is your assessment recently of the strength of al-Qaida? And I
know – perhaps maybe you would comment on its leadership or the status
of its current leadership, but the group as a whole.
Yeah, so al-Qaida has been
strategic and patient over the past several years. It’s let ISIS absorb
the brunt of the world’s counterterrorism efforts while patiently
reconstituting itself. And so what we see today is an al-Qaida that is
as strong as it has ever been. We see active and deadly al-Qaida
affiliates across the globe, including in Somalia, where al-Shabaab
commits regular attacks inside Somalia and also has begun to attack its
neighbors as well, particularly Kenya.
We see active al-Qaida plotting and activity elsewhere in Africa.
AQIM, al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb, JNIM in the Sahel region of Africa
– both of those organizations are extremely active. And for many
years, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen we assessed to be
probably the most threatening of the al-Qaida affiliates because of its
interest and capabilities in attacking the U.S. homeland.
No one should mistake the period of relative silence from al-Qaida as
an indication that they’ve gotten out of the business. They are very
much in this fight, and we need to continue to take the fight to them.
Hi. Ambassador Jeffrey, a few weeks ago
when you were in Aspen and you laid out the policy goals in Syria, the
first point that you made was that the U.S. wants to get Iranian groups,
Iranian proxies, out of Syria. So is it possible to have a political
settlement in Syria in which Iranian groups are still in the country at
all, and is Russia helping the U.S. with that effort any more so than
they have in the past year?
What we’re trying to pitch is
that if you get a resolution of the Syrian conflict as laid out in UN
Security Council Resolution 2254, December 2015, with an end to the
conflict though ceasefires, a new political process with a constitution
that has been reformed or replaced, and free and fair UN-regulated
elections, you will have a new situation that would allow not just the
Iranian but all foreign forces that were not there in 2011, which is
essentially only the Russians were there before 2011, to withdraw from
Syria. We are raising this publicly. We discuss it with the Russians.
We discuss it with everybody else involved.
So the onus would be on the Syrian government at that point to make sure that all of the groups are out of their country?
Exactly. They are legally
responsible for, just as we and anybody else is legally responsible
through treaties and agreements for foreign forces on your territory and
what those forces do, and we’re particularly concerned about what the
Iranian forces do, especially threatening Israel with long-range missile
systems. It’s up to the Syrians to get those – Syrian government to
get them out. Our hope is that if you resolve the underlying internal
conflict, the reason for these forces to be there, to the extent they
have an excuse to be there, would be gone.
And Ambassador Sales, can I just ask you
one question too? You mentioned that the repatriation of these ISIS
fighters and the prosecution is something that these European countries
should do, but when they are under political pressure to do just the
opposite and not follow through on that kind of action, what’s your
argument to them? Why should they face the political pressure backlash
that they will for doing something like that?
Well, I think the political
pressure is to be tough on terrorism. There are no constituencies
anywhere that say, “All right, terrorists? Let them off the hook,”
right? But the reality is the way to be tough on foreign terrorist
fighters is to prosecute them. Right now, they are not facing justice
for the crimes they have committed. They are in temporary holding
facilities, and we’ve seen a number of attempted jailbreaks. The risk
that they could get out is not trivial.
So I think the political dimension here needs to be inverted. If you
want to demonstrate to your voters that you’re taking the terrorist
threat seriously and you’re protecting your people from terrorists
roaming around the world at will, the way to do that is to bring them
home, put them in front of a court, have them tried, and then if they’re
convicted, make sure they serve lengthy sentences.
Thank you. There’s – it is reported that
North Korea send their military to Syria for the training for the
terrorists. Do you have any things that North Korea linkage with ISIS?
Nothing that I’m prepared to comment on in public.
North Korea has a long history of supporting —
— the regime, including – and the nuclear program, the Al Kibar site that was struck in 2007.
Mr. Sales, that sounds like yes.
If I wanted to say yes, I would have said yes.
Well, because the North Korea —
But if you wanted to say no, you could have said no.
That would take the fun out of it. (Laughter.)
Their cooperating, North Korea and Syria cooperate in their nuclear weapons stuff, so why not that you cannot say a yes or a no?
I think you have our answer.
There we go. So CNN. Go ahead, Jennifer.
Ambassador Sales, you mentioned earlier
that you’d like to see families put into rehabilitation. Is that U.S.
policy writ large that these families should not be prosecuted, or are
there instances where foreign terrorist fighters’ families should face
And then Ambassador Jeffrey, have you gotten any contributions, firm
contributions, from partners in the coalition to either the safe zone or
the continued fight?
So I think it’s case-by-case.
Some of the family members, particularly the women, have committed
crimes in support of ISIS. Others are victims of ISIS. Children in
almost every case, especially young children, should be treated as
victims of ISIS. And so I think our policy is where somebody has
committed a crime, prosecute them, and where somebody is a victim of
ISIS, ensure that they are given the social support and medical
attention and psychological services that they need.
How will you make that determination, though? Because some of these fighters have said they were victims of ISIS retroactively.
Again, that’s a case-by-case
question that you rely on law enforcement professionals, medical
professionals, and so on, to asses each particular person who comes
Wait, hold on.
Okay, this administration has
put a lot of emphasis on burden sharing for very good reasons, and we
see Syria and Iraq as a very good example. As I mentioned, we have
thousands of coalition troops from scores of coalition countries serving
side-by-side with us in Iraq. The coalition has provided over a
billion dollars in stabilization funding to Iraq, a significant part of
that American funding, and in addition, very large amounts for
Now, in Syria, three things. First of all, we are the biggest donor
with almost $10 billion, but the international community has also stood
up with, all in all, totally an even larger amount, although we’re the
largest donor, as I said. I was in a pledging conference in Brussels in
March that came up with $7 billion. Again, that’s humanitarian.
For stabilization for the northeast, last year we received $325
million from other countries. This year I am very confident we’ll
receive roughly an equal amount, but I can’t say that officially so I
can’t give you the numbers.
In terms of troops, again, we’re in conversation with – certainly in
the two digits of countries about possible troop contributions on the
ground, and some facilitation either in the air or next door, but we’re
particularly focused on troops on the ground in northeast Syria. That
was the President’s mandate to us, and I think we’re having success.
And eventually either we, or more likely they, will be announcing what
This is Namo Abdulla. I have two brief
questions. One on Iraq: Today ISIS launched an attack on the Kurdish
Peshmerga forces, killing at least four of them. And I just want to
know: What’s your assessment of the ISIS threat in Iraq? We thought it
was defeated. The second one is about Turkey. Foreign minister of
Turkey said he was rejecting your offer for the safe zone. Can you give
us more details about the offer? How large would the United States
want that safe zone be? What about the Kurds? What do they say?
Sure. First of all, as I said,
we’re concerned about ISIS attacks, ISIS – not physical presence, but
ISIS underground cells in that band of territory in Diyala, Saladin
provinces – again, south of Mosul in the Kurdish areas, down to just
north of Baghdad. And of course, the Kurds are occupying, the Peshmerga
are occupying a line at the north of that, and that’s where that attack
took place. And it’s another example of the tragic loss of life that
the Iraqis and Syrians in the thousands have paid for defeating ISIS.
We should remember that at all times. They have the biggest burden.
In terms of the safe zone negotiations, the minister took a pretty
tough position, but we’ve continued talking at various levels, including
military-to-military. The Turks want a deeper zone than the one that
we think makes sense. In our case, it’s between 5 and 14 kilometers
with heavy weapons drawn further back. And there are some
disagreements, or some differences of opinion I would say – I wouldn’t
put as much emphasis on this – on how we, the U.S. and the Turks, would
operate in that zone. But we’re willing to work with them on this. We
think that this is a deal that we can sell to the people of northeast
Syria. That’s very important.
Hi. Eric Tucker with the Associated
Press. I was wondering what either of you two gentlemen might be able
to say about the latest U.S. citizen repatriation just this week, and
what the circumstances of that particular case are.
So let me dodge that one. We are
aware of the reports about a repatriation that took place recently.
We’ll defer to DOJ on whether anything has happened, and if so, whether
to announce it.
But let me speak more broadly to the U.S.’s record in this space. So
the United States is leading by example. We’ve called on other
countries to repatriate and prosecute; that’s exactly what we did –
that’s exactly what we’ve done. To date, we have brought back five
adults – that’s four males and one female – who have been charged with a
variety of terrorism-related crimes, related to their involvement
and/or support to ISIS. One person has been convicted; in the other
four cases, the charges are pending. But in all five cases, you’re
looking at relatively severe penalties. For instance, our federal
criminal statute prohibiting the knowing material support to a terrorist
organization carries maximum penalties, upwards of 20 years. So we’re
taking this threat very seriously, and we’re using the law enforcement
tools at our disposal to address it.
Last question’s for Reuters, please.
Yeah, sorry, I want to come back to what
you mentioned on Africa. Can you tell us a little bit more about this
coalition – increased coalition, including Africa? Are a lot of the
fighters – have you seen any of the fighters coming out of Syria going
into Africa? You’ve traditionally spoken about Nigeria and Somalia,
Mali as well. Now you’re talking about DRC and you’re talking about
northern Mozambique. Is this a whole different set of ISIS? Is this a
new way that they are fighting? I mean it’s probably worth a separate
briefing, but whatever you can sort of —
Yeah. So if that’s a request to
defer my answer to that question until we can set up a separate
briefing, I’m happy to do so. (Laughter.) But in the meantime, let me
say I think it’s very much all of the above. In some cases, the
ISIS-affiliated fighters that you see in Africa are sort of indigenous
militants that have associated themselves with the ISIS brand. In other
cases, at the other extreme, what you see are battle-hardened ISIS
fighters who originated in Africa, traveled to the war zone in Syria and
Iraq, gained battlefield experience, and returned home to either found
or enrich existing ISIS affiliates. It’s a very complex picture, and
it’s one that we think the coalition has some value to add in terms of
addressing the solution. And that’s why we’re going to be encouraging
our coalition partners to focus on this challenge.
Where has the U.S. been successful in preventing that from spreading?
Where has the U.S. been
successful in preventing them from spreading? Well, I think every time
somebody is taken off the battlefield and incarcerated in Syria, and
especially every time one of those detainees is then taken back home and
prosecuted, that’s a success story right there.
Great. Thank you all. Thank you, Ambassador Jeffrey, Ambassador Sales.
Thank you, all.